Dirty Fuel Incentives in the Bailout Bill by Robins, Rand & Hager, Janet M.
Sustainable Development Law & Policy
Volume 9
Issue 2 Winter 2009: Climate Law Reporter 2009 Article 14
Dirty Fuel Incentives in the Bailout Bill
Rand Robins
Janet M. Hager
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/sdlp
Part of the Energy and Utilities Law Commons, Environmental Law Commons, and the Natural
Resources Law Commons
This Feature is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Sustainable Development Law & Policy by an authorized administrator of
Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact fbrown@wcl.american.edu.
Recommended Citation
Robins, Rand and Janet M. Hager “Dirty Fuel Incentives in the Bailout Bill.” Sustainable Development Law & Policy, Winter 2009, 42,
72-73.
42wInTer 2009
DiRty fuel incentiveS in the bailout bill
By Rand Robins & Janet M. Hager*
*Rand Robins and Janet M. Hager are J.D. candidates, May 2010, at American 
University, Washington College of Law.
The current dependence on oil in the United States cannot be supported in the future. The issue is how the United States will confront the growing problem of meeting its 
need for transportation fuel. One option is to develop uncon-
ventional fossil fuels derived from oil sands, oil shale, and liq-
uid coal. However, this is an option that could come at a great 
cost to the environment. The question facing Congress and the 
American people is whether, and to what extent, the govern-
ment should subsidize these environmentally devastating energy 
sources with tax incentives, direct financing, loan guarantees, or 
purchasing agreements.
The rate of consumption of oil in the United States is unsus-
tainable.1 The world uses twelve billion more barrels of oil each 
year than is discovered.2 Yet, the United States is expected to 
continue to increase its consumption of oil by forty-four per-
cent by the year 2025.3 Thus, there will not be enough supply 
to match the world’s demands for oil.4 Furthermore, the United 
States consumes eleven percent of the world’s production of 
oil, but only has three percent of the world’s oil reserves.5 This 
dependence on foreign oil threatens the country’s economy and 
national security.6 It is estimated that the oil dependence results 
in a penalty to the economy of $297 to $305 billion each year, so 
the threat to the economy is great.7 The threat to national secu-
rity is also substantial, considering that much of the oil that is 
imported into the United States comes from hostile areas of the 
world.8 
Because of these widespread problems with oil, it is not 
surprising that the United States is looking for new solutions. 
However, a transition to unconventional fossil fuels will only 
exacerbate the devastating problem of climate change. The 
threat to the global environment as a result of the continuing 
widespread use of fossil fuels is great.9 The global increase 
in carbon dioxide in the atmosphere is primarily the result of 
the increase in the use of fossil fuels like oil, and potentially 
these new unconventional fuels.10 The effect of the increase of 
greenhouse gases from fossil fuels has already been felt.11 The 
sea level is rising, glaciers are decreasing, and extreme weather 
events have become more frequent.12 It is expected that the sur-
face temperature will increase by 3.2 to 7.2°F beyond levels in 
the 1990s by the end of the century.13 The United States must 
decrease, not increase, its use of fossil fuels if it is to combat the 
growing problem of climate change.14 
There is evidence that unconventional fossil fuels will not 
just maintain the status quo, but will actually increase the rate 
of emissions of greenhouse gases in the United States.15 The 
two most viable unconventional fossil fuels are synthetic crude 
oil derived from oil sand (“SCO”) and fuel made from coal liq-
uefaction (“CTL”).16 The production of these fuels emits more 
greenhouse gases than conventional oil.17 The use of SCO emits 
twenty percent more carbon dioxide than lighter crude oils.18 
The use of CTL would result in twice the emissions of con-
ventional fuel.19 Additionally, mining for oil sand is similar to 
mining coal; these operations will require the addition of roads, 
pipelines, and other infrastructure, and will displace plant and 
animal life.20
Despite the questionable nature of these unconventional 
fuels, Congress has still taken steps to promote them. The tax 
code has been modified by the recent financial bailout bill, 
enacted in October of 2008, to subsidize CTL in three ways. 
First, the code reduces the cost of constructing expensive CTL 
plants by providing tax credits for capital investment.21 Second, 
the code reduces the cost of operating dirty fuel facilities by pro-
viding tax deductions for the operating costs of oil shale and tar 
sands refineries.22 Third, the code reduces the risk that falling oil 
prices will suffocate the market for non-traditional transportation 
fuels by applying the alternative fuel credit (originally intended 
for ethanol production facilities) to coal-based facilities.23
Although advocates for these unconventional fossil fuels 
promise energy independence, economic development, and 
improving environmental impacts, there is scant evidence 
to determine the likelihood of success on any of these prom-
ises.24 Moving forward with commercialization of any of these 
unconventional fossil fuels will lock the United States into more 
dependence on carbon-based transportation fuel at a time when 
the nation should be focusing on clean forms of energy.25 Law-
makers presented with this energy legislation in the recent bail-
out bill found themselves between a rock and a hard place: to 
vote for a bill with broad public backing that also gives sup-
port to dirty fuels, or to risk their political position by voting 
against the legislation.26 In the end, lawmakers chose to support 
the bill, despite its shortcomings in energy policy.27 In future 
legislation Congress should focus its efforts on deploying clean 
fuels, clean vehicles, and sustainable patterns of growth, rather 
than  subsidizing fuels that contribute to global environmental 
problems. 
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